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Abstract 
Health status during the working life plays a major role in the retirement decision. Significant links between 
professional paths, retirement age and retirement conditions (disability pension, inability pension, reduced-rate pension, 
or full rate by age) can be highlighted by logistic models regressions and a typology of the professional careers of the 
1940-generation of the French Social Security insured, whose the insurance period is insufficient to fulfill the full-rate 
pension criterion.
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     1. Introduction 
 
In France, the most main recent reform of the public and private sectors’ pension schemes 
took place in 2003 and 2010. The main measure was an increase in legal age of retirement, in 
the contribution period to 41 years in 2012 (increasing to 42 years in 2020), and an alignment 
of the contribution period of civil servants with that of private sector workers (40 years in 
2008). In this context, questions of health and in particular hard working conditions became 
part of the related public debate. 
 
The current French pay-as-you-go system partially recognizes health problems. The special 
schemes, which cover the employees of a few public sector and major national companies 
(national railways, the Paris public transportation system, electricity supply, and so on), take 
into account the difficulty of the working conditions by allowing early retirement before 60. 
The  Social  Security  pension  scheme  (the  basic  scheme),  which  covers  all  private-sector 
employees, takes health problems into account, but to a smaller extent. Firstly, periods of 
sickness and disability periods are included with periods of employment when calculating the 
pension. Secondly, at the end of one’s working life, unfit or disabled insured workers get a 
full pension from the age of 60 (see Appendix A). Furthermore, in 2003, the reform reduced 
by half the penalty applied to the pension in the case of early retirement prior to obtaining the 
full-rate.  This  measure  alleviates  the  financial  pressures  on  the  retirement  decision  for 
healthy, insured workers who would not qualify for disablement or disability pensions. 
 
These measures consider health problems occurring during a professional career and their 
consequences. But are they sufficient to compensate for the shortening of the employment 
and  retirement  durations  engendered  by  one’s  limited  physical  activities?  The  coming 
generations of retirees will have had less “orderly” careers than their predecessors, with more 
unemployment  and  non-working  spells,  so  that  the  proportion  of  persons  with  a  reduced 
pension  will  increase.  One  may  therefore  ask  if,  the  criteria  for  disablement  recognition 
correctly identify those who are unable to continue working. Is the softening of the retirement 
conditions  well-defined  for  identifying  this  unhealthy  population?  The  accuracy  of  the 
penalty reduction has yet to be assessed and it seems necessary to identify the individual 
factors determining the conditions and the choices at the end of one’s working life. 
 
Following our previous works (Barnay, 2005; Briard, 2006), this contribution focuses on the 
insured who retired with an insufficient insurance period to reach the full-rate (157 quarters 
for insured workers born in 1940). We use the Social Security pension scheme database 
which records all the events of a private sector worker’s professional career: their wages, 
unemployment  spells,  sick  leaves,  periods  of  disability,  etc.  Poor  health  is  identified 
throughout  the  career  by  both  sick  and  disability  leaves  of  absence,  and  at  the  end  of 
working-life by the granting of disablement or disability pension benefits. 
 
Here,  we  consider  two  possible  scenarios  influencing  the  retirement  timing.  In  the  first 
scenario, an administrative decision declares the worker unfit or disabled, which allows a 
full-rate retirement of the employee from the age of 60, without any decision being made by 
the worker. In the second scenario, beyond the age of 60, for employees who have not yet 
claimed their pension rights, there is the choice between a reduced rate pension before 65 and 
a full pension at 65; in that case, the worker has to carry out a labor/leisure trade-off and he is 
an actor in his decision. 
 To assess the degree of constraint on the retirement timing, particularly when one’s health 
has  suffered,  we  attempt  to  relate  the  retirement  modes  and  the  various  events  which 
constitute  the  career  (episodes  of  wage-earning,  unemployment,  nonworking,  sick  leave, 
etc.).  
After a brief survey of the empirical literature on the links between health and work statuses, 
we analyze the links between careers and retirement conditions for retirees born in 1940, 
distinguishing between those receiving a normal pension (reduced rate or full-rate according 
to the age) and those declared unfit or disabled.  
 
Our analysis proceeds in two main steps. First, a descriptive approach based on a typological 
analysis characterizes a reduced number of representative careers. Next, logistic models help 
to explain the retirement conditions from the characteristics of the career, particularly those 
resulting from bad health.  
 
2. Brief overview of literature 
 
2.1 How can one measure health status? 
 
The definition and measurement of health status can be problematic. Most recent studies use 
subjective  health  measurements  based  on  self-reported  assessments  (Campolieti,  2002). 
However,  these  measurements  suffer  from  significant  skews:  self-reported  biases 
(sociocultural notably) (Etilé & Milcent, 2006), endogeneity biases (the health status itself 
can distort the quality of the answer (Bound, 1991); and comparisons between individuals are 
delicate  due  to  their  different  value  systems.  Moreover,  the  justification’s  assumption, 
whereby an individual overrates their poor health status to justify a non-working situation, 
could partially explain this relationship.  
Such limitations are absent in objective health measurements such as the morbidity diagnosed 
by general practitioners. Also, the granting of daily sick leave benefits, disability pension 
benefits or disablement results from a medical protocol. Disability benefits are granted after 
an examination by the Social Security practitioner and paid to disabled insured workers under 
60 years old for a non-professional reason, and for whom the ability to work or their earnings 
is  reduced  by  at  least  two  thirds;  from  the  age  of  60,  the  old  age  pension  takes  over. 
Disablement pensions are granted by the Occupational Health Physician (OHP), who assesses 
the  compatibility  of  the  job  with  the  employee’s  health  status.  But  some  biases  remain, 
because  the  OHPs  can  be  inclined  to  delay  their  disablement  decision  if  it  leads  to  a 
dismissal, for example when reclassification is impossible. 
 
2.2 Health, work and retirement 
 
The determinants of the retirement decision are often only studied through a financial prism 
(Gruber & Wise, 2004) and few works are interested in early retirement, before the full rate is 
reached (Doerpinghaus & Feldman, 2001). However, a vast empirical literature highlights /a 
healthy worker effect/the effect of health on labor participation. Health problems affect one’s 
whole career.  In particular, a poor health status results in early departure from the labor 
market (Barnay, 2005; Blanchet & Debrand, 2008; Currie & Madrian, 1999; Lindeboom, 
2006; Tessier & Wolff, 2005) and less healthy workers wish to leave the labor market earlier 
(Rapoport, 2006). 
The choice of retirement age can be modeled as a decision of labor supply and the result of a 
trade-off between leisure and work, and probably also between level of health status and 
financial  constraints.  But  in  fact,  claiming  a  pension  is  not  always  concomitant  with withdrawal from the labor market, because two thirds of employees are no longer employed 
when they retire. In any case, there are many ways of permanently leaving the labor market. 
Hence, the impact of health status on retirement behavior has to be considered in the light of 
the various modes of withdrawal, such as the Job Seeking Exemption (until July 2008) or 
early retirements. The disablement and disability pensions are reserved for the unhealthiest 
people, but some unhealthy workers also stop their professional activity prematurely due to 




Testing the assumption of a healthy worker effect on the labor market requires a chronology 
of  the  disease  and  employment  episodes  along  the  professional  paths.  To  look  for  the 
determinants  of  retirement,  we  therefore  study  the  whole  career  and  proceed  with  two 
successive  steps:  a  classification  analysis  of  professional  careers  in  order  to  define  a 
typology, followed by an estimation using logistic models to understand the determinants of 
the retirement modes. 
In  the  first  step,  the  typological  analysis  allows  us  to  summarize  the  heterogeneous 
professional careers of private sector workers, which show complex configurations, with a 
mixture of periods of activity and different kinds of non-working statuses (unemployment, 
sick leave, disability, or without an identified reason). It captures the resemblances and the 
disparities  of  professional  careers  by  taking  them  globally,  without  any  theoretical 
assumptions (Bry & Antoine, 2004; Fénelon, Grelet, & Houzel, 2000). 
 
The classification analysis follows the methodology presented in Briard (2006), but it differs 
over  the  definition  of  the  wage  classes  and  in  the  addition  of  illustrative  variables.  It  is 
performed on those insured by the Social Security pension scheme and born between 1935 
and 1940. For the study, we only retain those pensioners alive on December 31
st, 2005, born 
in 1940, and having an insufficient insurance period to reach the full-rate (157 quarters). 
 
The method can be summarized in five points: 
1. The method is derived from textual statistics (Guérin-Pace, 1998) used for the study of 
itineraries. It is particularly designed to better catch the time variable than methods such as 
the optimal matching analysis (e.g. Abbot, 1995; Dijkstra & Taris, 1995). 
The career path between the ages of 15 and 59 is described, year per year, by fourteen annual 
exclusive statuses (en): (a) concerning the contributory periods: e1: annual wage < 2
nd decile 
of the distribution for the insured of the same generation, e2: wage < 4
th decile, e3: wage < 
median, e4: wage < 6
th decile, e5: wage < 8
th decile, e6: wage < Social Security earnings-
ceiling,  e7  ³  earnings-ceiling;  (b)  concerning  the  non-contributory  periods:  e8:  short-term 
unemployment (< average duration for the  generation),  e9: long-term unemployment; e10: 
sickness,  maternity,  employment  injury  (disability  <  66%);  e11:  disability;  e12:  national 
service;  e13:  quarters  validated  by  other  pension  schemes;  e14:  non-working  or  lack  of 
information (expatriate or in the public service). 
To be able to cluster the closest professional paths, while best preserving their evolution, the 
paths are described over five year periods (15-19, 20-2, etc.) using nine sequences of fourteen 
characters, the i
th character indicating the number of times when the i
th status is met. The 
reduction of the number of modalities is necessary to carry out the analysis. So, in an iterative 
way, we recode the modalities expressed by less than 1% of the insured on the basis of a 
more reduced number of statuses (13 then 12 then 11).  
 2. At the end of the coding phase, professional careers  are described by  nine qualitative 
variables and are subjected to a Multiple Correspondence Analysis (MCA). Then, the twenty 
main factors of the MCA become the active variables of a mixed classification, which chains 
a non-hierarchical algorithm of the k-means —iterated three times with the selection of the 
stable forms— and a hierarchical ascending classification. 
 
3. The optimal number of clusters is determined by the three statistical criteria (R² semi-
partial, pseudo T², pseudo F), which give information about the loss of homogeneity caused 
by the reduction of the number of clusters. 
 
4. A stratification is then made in order to use the available information in a heterogeneous 
way according to the generations. Basically, we identify the recipients of the Old-age pension 
for parents living at home (OPLH), introduced in 1972, and the insured for whom the pension 
calculation reveals a salaried activity in the public service or as an expatriate, which are 
rarely registered in the insured’s account before their retirement.  
 
5. Finally, to stabilize the final partition, a discriminant analysis is performed, connecting the 
ten clusters previously defined with the descriptive variables of professional careers (for each 
of nine five-years periods, fourteen variables counting the expression of a state in the initial 
list). 
 
The individual accounts are managed by the National old-age pension fund (Cnav). They 
include all the necessary data for the calculation of the pension: annual contributory wages 
(under the earnings-ceiling), periods of unemployment, of illness, maternity or occupational 
injury, and periods of disability benefits. This administrative database does not suffer from 
self-reported biases like self-reported data. To avoid endogeneity and measurement skews, 
studies  using  self-reported  measurements  use  different  health  measures.  Using  an 
administrative health measurement, endogeneity could result from the professional conditions 
of benefit allocation or the job conditions. However, its main disadvantage is that it mentions 
interruptions in a career only if they allowed the validation of an “assimilated period” (AP), 
i.e. a quarter considered equivalent to a quarter of insurance. In particular, periods of illness 
are only mentioned if the insured worker was contributing to the Social Security pension 
scheme during his sick leave, which lasted at least 60 days.  
 
In a second step, to better explain the retirement conditions, we perform logistic regressions. 
We consider explanatory variables such as sex, marital status, and country of residence at 
retirement,  and  descriptors  of  the  professional  path  such  as  the  number  of  years  with  a 
salaried occupation, with AP-disability, AP-sickness, and AP-unemployment (see Table 4A). 
We exclude the variable “number of years of non-working” (except unemployment, sickness 
or disability) for obvious reasons of multicollinearity. 
 
 
4. Results and discussion 
 
The  classification  analysis  identifies  ten  clusters  of  strongly  differentiated  professional 
careers (see Appendix B). It appears that some insured workers have to cope with health 
problems; some of them interrupt their professional careers and\or are granted a disablement 
or disability pension, while others meet health and financial difficulties. 
These disparities of career paths result in differences in retirement behaviors and retirement 
conditions, as shown in Table 1. A third of employees with an incomplete career wait until 65 to  claim  their  pension  rights,  39%  retire  at  60  because  of  disablement  or  disability 
(respectively  34%  and  5%),  while  27%  claim  their  rights  between  60  and  64  and  get  a 
reduced-rate pension. The retirement conditions are strongly gender differentiated. Women 
retire at 65 (or beyond) more frequently than men (41% vs. 21%), more often at 60 with a 
disablement  pension  (35%  vs.  32%)  and  less  often  retire  with  a  reduced  rate  (19.6%  vs. 
40.2%). These differences are particularly high in the clusters 2, 6, and 9 in which the full-
rate is acquired by the age (at 65), four or six times more often for women than for men. 
Other clusters are characterized by early retirements because of health problems: 45% of the 
insured in Cluster 5, “housewives with low wages”, and 38% of the insured in Cluster 2, 
“non-working  young”,  benefit  from  a  disablement  pension.  Finally,  retirement  with  a 
disability pension concerns 90% of Cluster 10, the “disabled young”, and 21% of Cluster 3, 
the “unstable”. 
 
Table 1  
Retirement Conditions by Cluster and by Sex (in %) 
 
Clusters  Disablement  Disability  Reduced 
rate 
Full rate  
by age  Total 
1: Precarious  33.9  2.7  24.1  39.3  35,9 
2: Non-working young   37.8  0.0  31.9  30.4  15.2 
3: Unstable  31.6  21.2  12.6  34.7  13.4 
4: Self-employed  33.3  0.1  28.8  37.8  12.4 
5: Recipients of OPLH  44.9  1.4  21.1  32.6  11.1 
6: Multipensioned of the 
public sector and expatriates  22.7  0.6  70.7  6.0  5.6 
7: Late employed  27.0  13.2  17.5  42.3  3.0 
8: Stable, high wages  15.7  6.4  38.6  39.3  2.2 
9: Stable, shortened career  23.1  15.4  43.6  17.9  0.6 
10: Disabled young  12.1  87.9  0.0  0.0  0.5 
Total  33.9  5.1  26.7  34.3  100.0 
 
Clusters 
Disablement  Disability  Reduced rate  Full rate  
by age  Total 
M  W  M  W  M  W  M  W   
1: Precarious  32.9  34.3  1.9  3.0  48.5  14.2  16.7  48.5  35.9 
2: Non-working young   36.5  38.3  .0  .0  57.0  21.5  6.5  40.2  15.2 
3: Unstable  32.8  30.5  22.8  19.7  9.8  15.1  34.8  34.6  13.4 
4: Self-employed  38.0  30.1  .3  .0  30.4  27.7  31.3  42.2  12.4 
5: Recipients of OPLH  66.7  44.8  .0  1.5  .0  21.2  33.3  32.6  11.1 
6: Multipensioned of the 
public sector and 
expatriates 
19.5  31.3  .8  .0  76.6  55.2  3.1  13.5  5.6 
7: Late employed  29.9  23.2  15.9  9.8  8.4  29.3  45.8  37.8  3.0 
8: Stable, high wages  18.4  8.1  5.8  8.1  40.8  32.4  35.0  51.4  2.2 
9: Stable, shortened career  27.3  .0  18.2  .0  42.4  50.0  12.1  50.0  .6 10: Disabled young  15.8  7.1  84.2  92.9  .0  .0  .0  .0  .5 
Total  31.5  35.2  7.0  4.1  40.2  19.6  21.4  41.1  100.0 
 
Source: CNAV, 1940 generation, those insured by the Social Security pension scheme with 
an incomplete career. 
Note: 32.9% of ‘precarious men’ claimed a disablement pension.  
 
Most  studies  which  use  an  individual  chronological  data  analysis  followed  by  an 
econometrical analysis, aim to study the individual determinants of/factors influencing the 
trajectories (e.g., McVicar & Anyadike-Danes, 2002). Our approach is different, in the sense 
that the professional path is not the dependent variable, but one of the explanatory variables 
of the retirement conditions. The professional careers are taken as a whole with all their 
complexity by the classification analysis. Belonging to a cluster is a “composite” variable of 
“simple”  variables  such  as  the  individual  features  (sex,  marital  situation,  country  of 
residence); the explanatory elements of the retirement conditions will be sought among these 
variables.  
 
By their nature, the retirement conditions are linked to age criteria. As indicated in the Table 
2, we observe that 80% of the recipients of a disablement pension and the totality of the 
recipients of a disability pension liquidate their pension rights at 60, and 83% of the insured 
claim their pension rights for a reduced rate at the same age. 
 
Table 2 
Conditions and Age of Retirement 
Age  Disablement  Disability  Reduced 
rate 
Full rate by 
age  Total 
60  79.7%  100%  82.9%  -  54.3% 
61  8.1%  -  7.4%  -  4.7% 
62  5.4%  -  6.1%  -  3.4% 
63  4.7%  -  2.6%  -  2.3% 
64  2.1%  -  1.0%  -  1.0% 
65  .1%  -  -  100%  34.3% 
N  2 116  319  1 669  2 139  6 243 
%  34%  5%  27%  34%  100% 
 
Source: CNAV, 1940 generation, those insured by the Social security pension scheme with 
an incomplete career. 
 
Further, the age and the retirement conditions depend heavily upon the careers, as shown in 
Table 3. On average, employees retire at 61.9 year of age. As expected, the “disabled young” 
(Cluster 10) claim their pension rights at 60. On the other hand, the precarious, self-employed 
workers, late employees and stable ones with high wages (Clusters 1, 4, 7 and 8) claim their 
pension rights at least two years later than the disabled young. 
 Table 3  
Average Age of Retirement, by Cluster 
 
  N  Age 
  mean  std-dev. 
1: Precarious  2,240  62.2  2.36 
2: Non-working young  948  61.7  2.25 
3: Unstable  836  61.9  2.34 
4: Self-employees  775  62.2  2.34 
5: Recipients of OPLH  691  61.9  2.30 
6: Multipensioned of the public sector and expatriates  352  60.5  1.29 
7: Late employed  189  62.4  2.37 
8: Stable with high wages  140  62.2  2.34 
9: Stable with shortened career  39  61.0  1.93 
10: Disabled young  33  60.0  .0 
Total  6,243  61.9  2.32 
 
As  we  have  already  noted,  information  about  health  status  is  captured  both  during  the 
working life by AP-illness and AP-disability and at retirement by the granting of disablement 
or  disability  pensions.  However,  the  explanatory  power  of  the  variable  “number  of  AP-
illnesses” is limited for the female population, because it includes maternity leaves (a quarter 
is validated for the leave for a childbirth if the mother was insured at the time by the Social 
Security pension scheme).   
At  60  years  of  age,  insured  workers  with  incomplete  career  paths  can  go  through  two 
successive episodes.  
The first episode concerns the insured who suffer from serious health problems. It leads to 
being unfit to work and/or a retirement at the earliest possible time, before 65. If the workers 
are declared unfit for work or disabled, they benefit from a full rate pension from 60.  
The second episode concerns the insured whose health status is relatively unchanged. They 
have to choose between claiming their rights for a reduced rate pension or waiting until the 
age of 65 to benefit from a full one. Other criteria than health status intervene in this choice, 
such as financial means or the standard factors of the labor supply such as the marital status 
(e.g. Coile, 2005; Henkens & van Solinge 2002; Sédillot & Walraët, 2002).  
Both episodes can be analyzed with two logistic regressions to understand the impact of 
health status on the retirement conditions, summarized in three modalities: retirement for 
reasons of disablement or disability, retirement at a reduced rate, and retirement at the full-
rate according to age. 
 
Table 4A  
General Statistics 
  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Min  Max 
Retirement age  61.94  2.32  60  65 
Number of years with AP-disability  .39  2.15  0  34 
Number of years with AP-sickness  1.08  1.71  0  14 
Number of years with AP-unemployment  1.41  2.85  0  22 
Number of years with a salaried occupation  22.36  37.98  0  146 
 Source: CNAV, 1940 generation, those insured by the Social security pension scheme with 
an incomplete career. N=6 243. 
 
Table 4B  
  N  % 
Sex (y = ”men”)  2,158  34.6 % 
Country of residence at retirement (y = ”France”)  5,295  84.8 % 
Marital status (y = ”Married”)  4,388  70.3 % 
 
Source: CNAV, 1940 generation, those insured by the Social security pension scheme with 
an incomplete career. N=6 243. 
 
Table 5 
Estimation for the two Episodes (Odd-Ratios) 
  Episode 1  Episode 2 
 
Unfit or disabled vs  
Reduced rate or full rate by age 
Reduced rate vs  
Full rate by age 
  M  W  Total  M  W  Total 
Women (ref: men) 
   
0.69*** 
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N  2 158  4 085  6 243  1 328  2 480  3 808 
N (yi=1)  830  1,605  2,435  867  802  1 669 
Quality of the model             















*  5%,  **  0.1%  et  ***  0.001%;  NS:  not  significant  (standard-errors). 
Source: CNAV, 1940 generation, those insured by the Social security pension scheme with 
an incomplete career. 
Note:  AP  =  “assimilated  period”:  one  quarter  of  insurance  validated  for  one  quarter  of 
disability, for 60 days of sickness leave, or 50 days of unemployment. 
The first episode concerns the whole population and explains the probability of benefiting 
from disability or disablement pensions from 60 years old (N=6,243). 
The  second  episode  only  applies  to  individuals  who  are  going  to  end  their  professional 
activity with a reduced or full-rate pension (N=3,808).  
In  episode  1,  in  the  case  of  a  very  bad  health  status,  we  cannot  refer  to  the  standard 
framework of the labor supply. Indeed, we can suppose that the “preference for leisure” is 
high  and  that  the  withdrawal  from  the  labor  market  is  imposed.  This  hypothesis  seems 
confirm for the male population, as the number of years with a salaried occupation which can 
approximate the individual incomes in this first stage has no impact on the decision. 
The more a career is marked by periods of disability, the greater the probability of benefiting 
from disability or disablement: for men, it is 2.3 times greater, other things being equal. For 
women, the correlation is so strong (99% of women with an AP-disability receive a disability 
or  disablement  pension)  that  the  associated  odd-ratio  is  superior  to  14.  There  is  thus  a 
threshold  effect  in  the  gravity  of  the  health  status,  beyond  which  the  agent  no  longer 
arbitrates in their retirement decision. 
If the health status does not justify the granting of these kinds of benefits, the employee has to 
make a choice under constraint, without the social coverage from which he could benefit 
during the first episode. Having been disabled has no impact on the probability of claiming a 
pension at a reduced rate rather than at the one. The healthy worker effect from this proxy 
thus seems determinant for early retirement during the first episode at 60. Disability affects 
the  unhealthiest  workers  and  in  fact  this  health  status’s  indicator  strongly  selects  the 
individuals, particularly women. During the first episode, the predominance of the health 
motive could also explain the eviction/replacement of the periods of unemployment by the 
periods  of  disablement  or  disability  as  relevant  explanatory  variables.  Unemployment  is 
barely  or  not  at  all  significant  there,  but  it  intervenes  during  the  second  episode  by 
influencing a retirement decision at 65. Doubtless, two categories of workers are concerned: 
on the one hand, healthy insured workers who have been through periods of unemployment 
and who are encouraged to work longer, and on the other hand, insured workers who are 
unemployed at the end of their working lives and are exempted from seeking employment as 
long as they cannot reach the full rate.  
Living  in  France  multiplies  by  about  3.5  the  probability  of  claiming  a  disablement  or 
disability  pension,  which  may  be  because  unhealthy  workers  have  little  inclination  to 
emigrate, particularly when they are about to request their pension rights from the French 
pension scheme. Furthermore, those living abroad at the end of their working life sometimes 
have  no  way  to  bring  attention  to  their  poor  health.  This  hypothesis  could  explain  their 
greater inclination to retire early to get the full rate. However, the gap remains small and 
other factors must be considered: the access to information, the continuation of a professional 
activity abroad not recognized by the French Social Security pension scheme, the difference 
of health level, and so on. 
The marital situation seems to play a protective role on the labor market for men: being 
married decreases their probability of claiming a disablement or disability pension by 43%, 
although it does not affect their choice between retirement at a reduced rate and retirement at 
65. Conversely, for women, being married only affects the choice of an early retirement at a 
reduced rate.  
Generally, women retire later than men. In 2006, 23% of them claimed their rights for the 
Social Security pension scheme at 65 or older, against only 13% of men. When considering 
retirees  with  an  incomplete  career,  born  in  1940,  these  disparities  between  men’s  and 
women’s  behaviors  still  remain  after  taking  into  account  periods  of  interruption  in  their 
careers, marital status and the country of residence. In particular, if the health status does not 
justify recognition of the disablement or the disability, women retire at 65 (or later) twice as 
frequently as men. This higher inclination of women to claim their pensions at full-rate could 
be explained by a life expectancy effect: they incorporate into their retirement behavior their 
favorable  life  expectancy,  and  the  resultant  risk  of  widowhood  and  need  to  support themselves.
2 Women are likely go on working if they are healthy, but they may also put off 
claiming their rights if their financial situations allow it; savings or their spouses’ incomes are 
then a means to finance the transition between an early withdrawal from the labor force and 
the first payment of the pension. Only the health status approximated by the number of sick 
leaves seems able to explain a departure before the age of 65. Additional analyses should 
therefore be performed to determine which part of this indicator/parameter is connected to the 
health status rather than maternity.  
In order to refine the understanding of the choice between the reduced and the full rates, we 




Estimation of the Probability of Obtaining a Reduced Rate vs. Full Rate for Three Clusters  
(Odd Ratios) 
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N  1 420  590  395 
N (yi=1)  540  302  105 
Quality of the model       









* 5%, ** 0.1% et *** 0.001%; NS: not significant (standard-errors). 
# Lack of data  
Source:  CNAV,  1940  generation,  those  insured  by  the  Social  security  pension  with  an 
incomplete  career. 
AP = “assimilated period”: one quarter of insurance validated for one quarter of disability, for 
60 days of sickness leave, or 50 days of unemployment.   
The results of these regressions are showed in the Table 6. They confirm the impact of the 
vagaries  of  a  career  path  on  retirement  behavior  revealed  above.  They  also  allow  us  to 
underline how different careers —here summarized in a typology— lead to different models 
of retirement behavior. 
For the precarious and the unstable, the more unemployment has affected the career, the later 
the retirement, while, for the precarious, having known periods of sickness tends to increase 
the  probability  of  obtaining  a  full  rate  by  age  pension.  A  woman  who  has  pursued  a 
“precarious”  career  (Cluster 1)  or,  even  more,  a  “non-working  young”  career  (Cluster 2), 
tends to postpone her retirement in comparison with a man. Most of those in the ‘precarious’ 
cluster have low wages, lower than the second decile of the wage distribution of the 1940-
generation insured at the same age. So, after an intermittent and low-paid working life, if the 
pension is their only income, their financial safety is certainly badly insured. Postponing their 
retirement allows them to expect a higher pension. The non-working young population is 
likely to be in a different situation. Their early withdrawal from the labor force could be 
explained by the existence of additional incomes (professional activity outside the private 
sector,  spouse’s  incomes,  capital  returns)  of  which  we  have  no  knowledge.  Like  the 
precarious, non-working young tend to put off their retirement, but once married, they can be 
less assertive in their decision. The joint decision model could then be determinant.
3 
This ambivalence when making decisions seems to disappear for the insured with erratic 
career paths (Cluster 3): being a woman who is married is a combination which tends to bring 
forward the retirement date. In the same way that these women would have privileged their 
family lives over their professional lives when they had children (less than a quarter of them 
are active between 25 and 31), they would have been able to make their retirements coincide 
with their spouses’. Nevertheless, in the absence of data on the professional status of the 




This article attempted to understand the retirement behavior of those insured by the Social 
Security pension scheme, born in 1940 and who claimed their rights without reaching the 
required insurance period for the full rate. By beginning with an exploratory analysis then 
moving  onto  explanatory  analyses  —a  classification  analysis  based  on  the  CNAV’s 
individual accounts, followed by logistic regressions— we were able to identify some of the 
links between professional career and age of retirement, notably the impact of health status 
on  retirement  conditions:  departure  conforming  with  the  disablement  or  disability,  or  the 
choice  between  a  reduced  rate  pension  and  a  full  pension  at  65.Careers  influence  the 
conditions and the age of retirement. Even when we consider homogeneous populations in 
terms of their career path profiles, health is an important factor in retirement planning and 
health  shocks  tend  to  increase  the  propensity  to  retire  earlier.  Periods  of  sick  leave  and 
disability,  which  reveal  (sometimes  extremely)  bad  health,  are  added  to  the  factors  of 
vulnerability on the labor market: unemployment, non-working and low wages. 
We analyzed the retirement conditions through two episodes based on two different lines of 
reasoning. The first is based on the healthy worker effect and the physical impossibility of 
pursuing a professional activity. Retirement conforming with the disablement or the disability 
then  depends  on  a  medical  examination.  These  results  underline  the  essential  roles  that 
continued employment and retirement policies play in the number of years spent healthy and 
at work. In order to decrease the number of recipients of disability and disablement pensions, 
it should be possible to invest in health at work during the entire career so that health shocks 
are  avoided.  Such  a  measure  would  aid/take  some  pressure  off  public  health  insurance finances and the PAYG system in France, and increase the employment rate before the age of 
60, under favorable labor market conditions. 
Those who do not benefit from these specific conditions of premature departure move into 
the second episode —the choice between a reduced rate pension between 60 and 65 or a full-
rate from 65. In that case, the decision corresponds more to a classic work / leisure trade-off. 
Household incomes and the marital status can then play an essential role. Women, who often 
have lower incomes than their spouses, as a result seem to be more inclined to delay applying 
for their pension rights. However, they seem to bring forward their retirement dates when 
they give greater priority to their family lives. 
The professional typology highlights very frail populations, such as the recipients of the Old-
age-pension-for-parents-living-at-home, which is predominantly a population of mothers. It 
seems necessary to maintain, or even better to increase, the Assimilated Period designed to 
compensate women for their children’s education. 
Data  on  financial  resources,  the  gravity  of  the  health  status,  working  conditions  and  the 
nature of jobs would certainly afford other significant elements for studying the determinants 
of the departure at a reduced rate. This would allow progress on the link between physical 
difficulty of work and age of retirement. This relation is crucial for the correct adjustment of 
the Social Security pension scheme parameters, as workers must not be encouraged to retire 
prematurely and unnecessarily, which would weigh down financial expenses, but must also 
not be prevented from retiring early when justified by their health status. References 
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Appendix A. Retirement conditions in the French Social Security pension scheme 
 
For this study, four retirement conditions for pension rights are distinguished:  
1. The disablement pension: the insured is declared unfit for work; their pension is 
calculated at the full-rate, whatever their age and insurance period. 
2. The disability pension: at 60, unless the insured person works in a profession and 
wishes to continue, the pension is calculated at the full rate. 
3. The reduced rate pension: the insured claims his pension rights before the age of 65 
but does not have a sufficient insurance period (157 quarters for the 1940 generation). 
4. The full-rate pension according to age: the insured claims his pension rights at the 
age  of  at  least  65,  his  pension  is  then  calculated  at  the  full-rate,  independently  of  his 
insurance period. 
The other retirement conditions are not considered in this paper for two reasons: they 
only concern insured workers with a long insurance period (the case of the normal pension 
with  the  full-rate  before  65);  or  they  are  granted  to  specific  populations  (war  veterans, 
deportee, etc.). Appendix B. Ten clusters of professional careers 
 
Cluster by decreasing number of insured: 
 
Cluster 1: “The precarious” (35.9% of the population; 28.9% men, 71.1% women) 
The careers are split, the wage-earning rate in the private-sector does not exceed 45% and the 
wages are for the most part lower than the 2
nd decile. 
Cluster 2: “The non-working young” (15.2% of the population; 29.2% men, 70.8% 
women)   
The careers are short, pursued only in the private-sector, and concentrated at the beginning of 
working life: the maximum rate of wage-earners (46%) is reached at the age of 19. 
Cluster 3: “The unstable” (13.4% of the population; 47.8% men, 52.2% women)  
The careers are precarious and split. In most, two thirds of the insured are employed and the 
second part of the working life is marked by periods of sickness (from 6% to 11% from the 
age  of  45),  of  unemployment  (more  than  10%  from  40,  and  more  than  a  quarter  of  the 
population after 45) or of disability (more than 10% of the population from 54). For more 
than two thirds of the employees, the wages are lower than the median wage. 
Cluster 4: “The self-employed” (12.4% of the population; 40.4% men, 59.6% women) 
The careers are long, begun in the private-sector, then pursued in a sector covered by another 
old-age scheme than that of the public service or one abroad. The employment rate exceeds 
90% between 40 and 51 years of age. The wages are very low, mainly lower than the 2
nd 
decile after the age of 40. 
Cluster 5: “The recipients of the Old-age-pension-for-parents-living-at-home” (11.1% 
of the population; .4% men, 99.6% women)  
The careers are typically those of mothers with several children and modest incomes: the 
private-sector career is short, with breaks at the births of the children, then restarting around 
35-40 years of age. The insured workers in this cluster benefit from the OPLH for at least 
seven years. Their wages are very low, lower than the 2
nd decile of the wage distribution of 
their generation, which may be a sign of part-time or seasonal activities, or temping. 
Cluster 6: “The multipensioned of the public sector and expatriates” (5.6% of the 
population; 72.7% men, 27.3% women)   
The careers are long, pursued for the main part in the public service or as expatriates, for at 
least nineteen years. The private-sector wage-earning rate remains low, always lower than 
40%. The wages are mostly very low, lower than the 2
nd decile after the age of 40. 
Cluster 7:  “Late  employed”  (3.0%  of  the  population;  56.6%  men,  43.4%  women) 
The careers begin relatively late: the private-sector wage-earning rate only reaches 50% at the 
age of 30, but it exceeds 80% from 38 to 51. Careers are continuous although their ends are 
marked by sickness, disability or unemployment. The wages are mainly lower than the 6
th 
decile and at most nine years are paid over the median wage before the age of 40. 
Cluster 8: “Stable employees with high wages” (2.2% of the population; 73.6% men, 
26.4% women)   
The careers are relatively continuous and the private-sector wage-earning rate remains higher 
than 50% from the age of 27 to 57. The end of the career is however marked by sickness, 
disability or unemployment. The wages are stable, and mostly superior to the 8
th decile from 
30 years old on, even reaching the earnings-ceiling. 
Cluster 9: “Stable employees with a shortened career” (.6% of the population; 84.6% 
men, 15.4% women)   
The careers are continuous, the private-sector wage-earning rate exceeds 80% from 25 to 47 
years  of  age,  but  the  end  of  the  working-life  is  marked  by  sickness,  disability  or unemployment. At least ten years are paid over the median wage before the age of 40. The 
wages can reach the 8
th decile from the age of 30, but they stay below the earnings-ceiling. 
Cluster 10: “Disabled  young” (.5% of the population; 57.6% men, 42.4% women) 
The private-sector career is prematurely interrupted by periods of sickness (from 25 to 40 
years, at least 10% of the workforce of the cluster are concerned). More half of the insured of 
the cluster are recognized as having a disability after the age of 35 years, and more than 85% 
after 50 years. 
 